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Defendant Paul Hardman, by and through his counsel of record, respectfully submits
the following Petition for Rehearing:

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND OVERLOOKED THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
STATE V. PENA, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (SEE EXHIBIT "A").
Defendant respectfully submits that this Court overlooked the Utah Supreme Court's

decision in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), (which was decided after the briefing
in this case), in rendering its opinion and thus misapprehended the appropriate standard of
review. In Pena, Chief Justice Zimmerman, writing for a unanimous Court, examined the
standard of review to be applied when the trial court has applied a legal principle to the facts
before it:
Although the universe of questions presented for review has often been
characterized as consisting only of mutually exclusive questions of fact and
law, there is really a third category-the application of law to fact or, stated
more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the
reach of a given rule of law. It is this determination that is at the heart of the
dispute between the parties over the appropriate standard of review for reasonable-suspicion determinations. [In this case Rule 26(b)(3) "anticipation of
litigation" vs. ordinary course of business determination].
Id. at 936 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that in determining the proper
standard of appellate review, the Court must consider how much discretion is vested with the
trial court:
At this point, we must attempt to determine when the articulated legal rule to
be applied to the set of facts-a rule that we establish without deference to the

trial courts—embodies a de facto grant of discretion which permits the trial
court to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a
particular set of facts without risking reversal.
Id. at 937. The extent of discretion varies from a little, requiring a "de novo" review of the
trial court's conclusion, to a lot, requiring "broad discretion." The Court compared the
spectrum of discretion to a pasture:
The helpful metaphor Professor Rosenberg uses in describing these
degrees of discretion is that of a pasture. To the extent that a trial judge's
pasture is small because he or she is fenced in closely by the appellate courts
and given little room to roam in applying a stated legal principle to facts, the
operative standard of review approximates what can be described as "de
novo." That is, the appellate court closely and regularly redetermines the
legal effect of specific facts. But to the extent that the pasture is large, the
trial judge has considerable freedom in applying a legal principle to the facts,
freedom to make decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves
ab initio but will not reverse—in effect, creating the freedom to be wrong
without incurring reversal. Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence
or when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining the law
by fencing off a part of the pasture previously available does the trial judge's
decision exceed the broad discretion granted.
As can be imagined, the real amount of pasture permitted a trial judge
will vary depending on the legal issue, although the terminology we use to
describe the operative standard of review does not begin to reflect the many
shades of this variance. The best we can do is to recognize that such a
spectrum of discretion exists and that the closeness of appellate review of the
application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of this spectrum.
Pena. 869 P.2d at 937-38. In order to determine the "size of the pasture," the Court set forth
three factors for granting trial judges discretion on legal questions:
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and
varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all those facts can
be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the legal principle is to be
2

applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to
anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge has observed "facts," such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be
adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts.
Id. at 938-39.
Such a determination is crucial to this case. If the appropriate standard of review
vests broad discretion in the trial court to determine whether a particular document was
prepared "in anticipation of litigation," the ruling may be affirmed although the appellate
court found error. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38. Such "broad discretion" may, as the Court
stated, be presumed: "[U]ntil the appellate court has fenced off a particular area of pasture,
that is, determined that a particular fact situation does or does not create reasonable suspicion
as a matter of law—the trial court has discretion to venture into that area—in other words, to
determine whether a given set of facts satisfies the legal standard of reasonable suspicion."
Id. at 940, n.5.
In this case, the Utah Court of Appeals did not state the standard by which it
reviewed the trial court's ruling, but the opinion suggests that this Court applied a "de novo"
standard of review which provided no discretion to the trial court. In other words, this Court
failed to determine whether the rules governing discovery "permit the trial court to reach one
of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without
risking reversal." Id. at 937. Defendant respectfully requests a rehearing to address these
issues.
3

II.

THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GOLD STANDARD V. AMERICAN RESOURCES, 805 P.2d
164 (Utah 1990).
This Court looked for guidance in resolving this case to Gold Standard v. American

Resources, 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990) (which did not involve a insurer claim file), where the
Utah Supreme Court reviewed the decisions of other jurisdictions before setting forth factors
to be examined in determining whether a document was created in "anticipation of litigation." The Court considered the "strict approach" that any document "which has not been
requested by nor prepared for an attorney nor which otherwise reflects the employment of an
attorney's legal expertise must be conclusively presumed to have been made in the ordinary
course of business and thus not within the purview of the limited privilege of new Rule
26(b)(3)." Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovida. 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. 111.
1972) (emphasis added).
However, the Utah Supreme Court rejected this approach and instead created a test in
which "attorney involvement is only one factor to be weighed in determining the applicability
of the work-product privilege." Gold Standard, 805 P.2d at 169. Rather than focus exclusively upon attorney involvement, the Court counselled that a determination of "whether a
document was prepared in anticipation of litigation should focus on the 'primary motivating
purpose behind the creation of the document.'" Id.
In its decision, this Court focused solely upon whether an attorney was involved in
reaching its conclusions, although, as set forth below, there were additional factors which
4

were considered by the trial court which were overlooked by this Court. Thus, while this
Court concludes that "Utah has only slightly modified the rigid Thomas Organ approach,"
the decision suggests a return to the "strict approach" of Thomas Organ in which attorney
involvement is the sole and exclusive measure of "anticipation of litigation." Defendant
respectfully submits that this Court misapprehended and did not follow the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Gold Standard.

ffl.

THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THE
TRIAL COURT IN RULING THAT THE CLAIMS FILE WAS PROTECTED AS PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION.
In its decision, the Utah Court of Appeals stated as follows:
Defendant argues only that, in 1986, Utah Farm Bureau's attorney sent a letter
instructing its claims agents on how to prepare claim reports in the event of
litigation. This fact does not support defendant's argument that the particular
documents prepared in this case were prepared at the request of an attorney.

(Opinion, p. 7). In Defendant's brief, and before the trial court, Defendant presented other
facts which were overlooked by this Court in rendering its opinion. For example, Defendant
presented the testimony of Officer Jerry Monson, who in his report prepared on the morning
after the accident stated:
Action Taken: RP [Reporting Party/Hardman] wanted to show R/D [Reporting
Deputy] the fence because he's afraid of being suied [sicl for having his horse
cause an accident. [Emphasis added]

5

R. 311. (Utah County Offense Report, attached as Exhibit "F" to Brief and Exhibit "B" to
this Petition). It was shortly after meeting with Officer Monson and telling him he was
afraid of being sued that Defendant met with insurance adjuster Robert Harmon from Utah
Farm Bureau. The reason Defendant met with Officer Monson and adjuster Harmon the
morning after the accident was to show them that his fences had been knocked down by
trespassers. The officer prepared a report, which was used at trial, evidencing that trespassers knocked down his fence. His insurance adjuster obtained a statement and took photographs. (The photographs were provided based on "substantial need" and used at trial.)
Defendant wanted proof that his horse being on the road was not his fault. Why did he need
proof? Because he anticipated litigation and was "afraid of being suied [sic]."
Rule 26(b)(3) provides that documents "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative" are protected.
Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that Utah Farm Bureau prepared its file in "the
ordinary course of business" while overlooking the fact that the "party," Paul Hardman, did
anticipate litigation, as evidenced by his statement to the sheriff (which was before his
statement to insurance adjustor Harmon).
Moreover, it is uncontroverted that the Plaintiff was seriously injured in the accident
and, at the time the statement to Harmon was given, she was still in a coma. Since Mr.
Hardman's horse was on the road, both he and his insurance company anticipated litigation
and they were correct in anticipating that Hardman would be sued.
6

The Court also overlooked the affidavit of Utah Farm Bureau's adjuster, Greg
Johnson, and the following concept as set forth by the Supreme Court of Washington:
An insured is contractually obligated to cooperate with the insurance company.
Such an obligation creates a reasonable expectation that the contents of statements made by the insured will not be revealed to the opposing party. The
insurer, on the other hand, has a contractual obligation to act as the insured's
agent and secure an attorney. The insured cannot choose the attorney but can
expect the agent to transmit the statement to the attorney so selected. Without
an expectation of confidentiality, an insured may be hesitant to disclose
everything known. Such non-disclosure could hinder representation by its
selected attorney.
Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 706 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 1985).
In Gold Standard, the Utah Supreme Court counselled that courts should look to the
'"primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document.'" Gold Standard, 805
P.2d at 169. As indicated above, the primary purpose behind Mr. Hardman's call to both
the Utah County Sheriff and Utah Farm Bureau was that he anticipated being sued as a result
of his horses escaping and being involved in a serious accident. Utah Farm Bureau acted
upon this fear and prepared its claim file. Defendant respectfully submits that had this Court
considered these facts, instead of focusing solely upon attorney involvement, it could have
concluded, as both trial judges did, that the statement was given in anticipation of litigation.

7

IV.

THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER DOCUMENTS CONTAINING MENTAL IMPRESSIONS OF INSURANCE ADJUSTERS AND DOCUMENTS CREATED
AFTER THE DATE THE CLAIM WAS MADE SHOULD ALSO BE
PRODUCED.
In its decision, this Court ruled that:
[T]he trial court erred in holding that adjuster Harmon's investigative file was
prepared in anticipation of litigation and therefore protected by the workproduct doctrine.

However, the Court did not address in its opinion whether certain materials containing the
mental impressions of Mr. Harmon and other adjusters must also be produced. The Utah
Supreme Court stated in Gold Standard: "[I]f the documents convey the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or party, the documents will be
afforded heightened protection as 'opinion work product.'" Gold Standard, 805 P.2d at 168.
Moreover, the claim file contains sixty documents which were prepared from the date of the
accident until six months after suit was filed. The Court's opinion contains no decision
regarding where along that time continuum the documents ceased being prepared in the
ordinary course of business and began being prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Attached as Exhibit "A" to the Brief and Exhibit "C" to this Petition is the Privileged
Log of the Utah Farm Bureau File. There are several examples of documents which contain
the mental impressions of the adjuster, including status reports, (entries 16-19 and 22), and
Reserve Sheets (entries 11 and 14). As indicated in the initial brief, the Reserve Sheets
contain the adjuster's estimate of what the claim could potentially be worth. The status
8

reports contain the mental impressions of the adjuster as to the respective liability of the
parties. Obviously, Defendant submits that it would be patently unfair for the Plaintiff to
have the benefit of the insurer's mental impressions regarding the case when the Defendant
has no equivalent benefit. Such is contrary to what Rule 26(b)(3) was intended to protect.
Moreover, on January 17, 1991, Mark James, counsel for Plaintiff wrote a letter to
Utah Farm Bureau advising it of his representation and the claim he was making on behalf of
his client. Certainly, at that time, Utah Farm Bureau had cause to anticipate litigation and
any documents provided after that period were produced in anticipation of litigation.
However, the Court's opinion fails to address these issues or provide guidance to the trial
court in ruling which of the sixty documents contained in the insurer claim file should be
produced. The decision only refers to the "investigative file" and thus, does not resolve all
issues presented for appeal.

V.

THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE BURDEN OF PROVING
HARMLESS ERROR.
In its decision, the Court departed from general principles of "harmless error" and

held that:
[T]he burden of demonstrating that the erroneous denial of a discovery request
was not prejudicial must therefore rest with the party resisting discovery. Id.

9

However, at the same time, the Court states:
[I]n some cases, a trial court might examine documents in camera to determine
the import of their contents. However, this approach is unsatisfactory in this
context. We are concerned not only with whether the requested information on
its face might change the outcome of the trial, but also with what impact
discovery of that information might have had on trial counsel's overall preparation and conduct in the trial. Only in the most clear-cut cases could any
judge, without the benefit of counsel's thinking and strategy, make a determination as to whether information in the documents could aid the requesting
party.
(Opinion, p. 8, n.l).
Thus, while on the one hand, the Court has placed the burden of demonstrating that
the error was harmless upon the party resisting discovery, the Court on the other hand has
eliminated any means of meeting that burden by stating that a Court cannot presume
"counsel's thinking and strategy." In other words, the Court has imposed a burden upon
Defendant but removed any means of meeting that burden, in effect ruling that any erroneous
denial of a discovery request is reversible error per se.
Moreover, Defendant was not aware nor advised that this Court viewed him as having
the burden of proving "harmless error" until the Court of Appeals ruled in this case. The
Plaintiff did not dispute in her memorandum that she maintained the burden of proving
harmless error, and there is no Utah case authority suggesting that the party resisting
discovery has the burden of proving harmless error.
Defendant respectfully requests a rehearing so that he may have the opportunity to
meet this burden. Towards that end, Defendant has attached as Exhibit "D" a copy of his
10

statement to his insurance adjuster Harmon which this Court ordered produced. Attached as
Exhibit "E" is a copy of a chart comparing what Mr. Hardman said in the statement with
Mr. Hardman's trial and deposition testimony. A comparison of Mr. Hardman's statement
to his deposition and trial testimony reflects that it is, in all material respects, the same.
Hence, a failure to produce it was harmless error.
Arguably, this Court has acted as a finder of fact in ruling with respect to the
contents of the unproduced statement. As the finder of fact, this Court should: (1) review
the statement to determine if the trial court's error was harmless; and (2) invite Plaintiff's
counsel to file a response to this Petition outlining how the contents of the statement
constitute prejudicial error and how production of this statement at an earlier time would
have altered his trial strategy or preparation. On the other hand, if this trial court is not the
finder of fact, and if fairness and justice are given full consideration, this Court should
remand this matter to the trial court for a determination as to whether or not the contents of
the statement would have made a difference in the jury verdict before a ten day trial is
ordered.
In its final footnote, this Court rejected an approach which would renew remanding
the case to the district court for a determination of whether prejudice resulted, suggesting
there was a lack of authority for such a procedure. However, this approach was used by the
Supreme Court of Mississippi in Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So.2d 1232 (Miss.
1992), wherein the Court held:
11

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
compel an answer to the Dawkinses' Interrogatory Number 4. As noted by
another court in another jurisdiction:
Erroneous denial of a discovery is ordinarily prejudicial in the
absence of circumstances showing it is harmless. Here, since we
cannot determine from the record whether the requested documents might have changed the result in this trial, we cannot say
the error was harmless.
Weakee v. Norton. 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings during which the Dawkinses may
have the discovery requested. We are, of course, not in a position to determine whether the information to be developed will warrant a new trial as
to the issues of fraud, gross negligence, and punitive damages, and we,
therefore, leave that determination to the sound discretion of the trial
court in accordance with our rules of civil procedure.
Id. at 1236 (emphasis added). This is consistent with the sound rule developed in this
jurisdiction which provides that the trial court exercises discretion in determining whether an
error is prejudicial, thereby warranting a new trial. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d
789, 799 (Utah 1991). Defendant respectfully submits that the appropriate procedure would
remand this matter to the trial court for a factual determination of whether the error was
harmless.

VI.

THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE IMPACT OF ITS DECISION
UPON INSURANCE CLAIMS PRACTICES.
Defendant respectfully contends that this Court misapprehended the impact its

decision would have upon the insurance industry and claim procedures. This Court (in a
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panel composed of Judge Orme, Judge Bench, and Judge Greenwood) has imposed upon
insurers in "third party" cases such as this a "fiduciary duty to its insured to protect the
insured's interest as zealously as it would its own." Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 840 P.2d 130, 138 (Utah App. 1992). This Court has also held that "an insurer acts an
agent for the insured with respect to the disputed claim" because "the insured is wholly
dependent upon the insurer to see that the insured's interests are protected." Id. at 138.
However, with this decision, this Court holds that despite this fiduciary obligation,
the insurer has a duty to produce its claim file. This creates a fundamental inconsistency
whereby, on the one hand, the insurer has a duty to zealously investigate the claim to fulfill
its fiduciary obligation, but on the other hand it must do so with the full knowledge that any
investigation conducted by the "agent" (in this case, Utah Farm Bureau) will be given to and
used by the opposition for the express purpose of destroying the "principal" (in this case,
Hardman). This Court's decision makes the "fiduciary" (Utah Farm Bureau) the instrument
or "agent" of the plaintiff (Askew).
The drafters of Rule 26(b)(3) recognized this fiduciary duty in protecting documents
prepared by or for a party's representative "including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent)." The 1970 revisions to this Rule, which added this language,
reflected this Court's own holdings that an insurer has duties similar to that of an attorney—
both are "fiduciaries" whose duty it is to "zealously defend the interests of the" client or
insured. However, this Court denies to the insurer the same benefits which it provides to the
13

attorney as a matter of right. If an attorney "fiduciary" takes a statement to protect his client
or prepare his case, it is conclusively presumed under Gold Standard and this Court's
decision to be taken in "anticipation of litigation." However, if an insurer "fiduciary" takes
the identical statement, it is not.
These considerations were not addressed in Gold Standard because that case dealt with
an "in house" investigative report rather than an insurer's claim file. However, a case relied
upon by the Court in Gold Standard examined the distinction between in-house files and the
role of the insurer. Janicker v. George Washington Univ.. 94 F.R.D. 648 (D.D.C. 1982).
There, the Court held that an in-house memorandum prepared regarding an accident was not
protected because it was prepared in the ordinary course of business. However, "the
investigative file of the Hartford Insurance Company would appear to have been prepared in
anticipation of claims, which if denied, would have clearly led to suits and litigation." Id- at
651.
After the briefing in this case, the District Court of Colorado considered whether a
claim file prepared with respect to a third-party claim (liability insurance) was protected. The
Court noted that "liability insurance is nothing more than litigation insurance" and held as
follows:
For this reason, it is logical to conclude that, while claims generated in
relation to first party claims are made in the ordinary course of business and
are discoverable, files generated during the investigation of third party claims
are made in anticipation of litigation and are not discoverable.

14

Weitzman v. Blazing Pedals. Inc., 151 F.R.D. 125, 126 (D. Colo. 1993).
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision in light of the
impact which such a holding will have upon insurance claim practices and the duties owed by
an insurer to an insured. The impact of this Court's decision is already beginning to be
realized. Attached as Exhibit MF" is a copy of a Request for Production of Documents
served in a civil case pending in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake County. This Court's
decision will create a similar situation in almost all civil cases, but this Court's decision
provides little analysis which would allow the trial court to resolve such a discovery request.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests a rehearing.
DATED this ^ 5 ~ day of October, 1994.
MORGAN & HANSEN

Stephen'G. Morgan
Mitchel T. Rice
Attorneys for Defendant
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932 Utah

869 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Affirmed as to B & B; reversed and remanded as to Curtis.

events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind.

HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, J J., concur.

See pubiication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.
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= KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jose Carlos PENA, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 930101.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 15, 1994.
Defendant conditionally pled guilty in
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., to attempted unlawful possession of controlled substance, after
denial of his motions to suppress evidence.
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals
certified case to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that:
(1) police stop of automobile in which defendant was passenger was supported by reasonable suspicion, despite fact that police had
not beforehand interviewed store clerk who
reported robbery to assure that crime had
taken place; (2) defendant effectively waived
his rights when police read Miranda warnings to him; and (3) strip search of defendant at jail after his arrest was supported by
reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying drugs.
Affirmed.
Howe, J., concurred in result.
1. Criminal Law <s=>1158(l)
For purposes of determining appellate
court's standard of review of trial court ruling, "factual questions" are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things,

2. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3)
For purposes of determining appellate
court's standard of review of trial court ruling, "legal determinations" are defined as
those which are not of fact but are essentially
of rules or principles uniformly applied to
persons of similar qualities and status in
similar circumstances.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

3. Criminal Law <3=>1158(1)
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of fact.
4. Criminal Law <3»1158(1)
Findings of fact are reviewed by appellate court under clearly erroneous standard.
5. Criminal Law e=*1158(l)
For reviewing court to find clear error
in trial court's findings of fact, it must decide
that findings are not adequately supported
by record, resolving all disputes in evidence
in light most favorable to trial court's determination.
6. Criminal Law <2>1159.4(2)
Trial judge is considered to be in best
position to assess credibility of witnesses and
to derive sense of proceeding as a whole,
something appellate court cannot hope to
garner from cold record.
7. Criminal Law e=>1134(3)
Appellate review of trial court's determination of law is usually characterized by term
"correctness."
8. Criminal Law <s=>1134(3)
For purposes of appellate review of trial
court's determination of law, "correctness"
means that appellate court decides matter
for itself and does not defer in any degree to
trial judge's determination of law.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

STATE v. PENA

Utah 933

Cite as 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

9. Criminal Law o=>1134(3)
In the abstract, effect of given set of
facts is question of law and, thus, one on
which appellate court owes no deference to
trial court's determination.
10. Criminal Law 01134(3)
Proper standard of review to be applied
to trial court determination of whether specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable
suspicion so as to support police stop is determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being fact determination reviewable for clear
error. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const.
Art. 1, § 14.
11. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3)
Legal standard for reasonable suspicion
to support police stop is standard that conveys measure of discretion to trial judge
when applying standard to given set of facts.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1,
§ 14.
12. Criminal Law C=*ll34(3)
Sufficiently careful appellate review of
trial court's application of standard of reasonable suspicion to support police stop is
necessary to assure that purposes of reasonable suspicion requirement are served.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1,
§ 14.
13. Arrest <3=>63.5(6)
Police stop of automobile in which defendant was passenger was supported by reasonable suspicion, despite fact that police had
not beforehand interviewed store clerk who
reported robbery to assure that crime had
taken place, where dispatched report gave
officer sufficient information for him to form
reasonable suspicion that defendant or driver
of automobile had committed crime.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1,
§ 14.
14. Criminal Law <£»412.2(5)
Defendant effectively waived his rights
when police read Miranda warnings to him,
despite defendant's contention that he did
not fully understand English, as trial court
found that defendant had no problem understanding English.

15. Criminal Law e=>412.2(5)
Waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from defendant's actions and words,
and is based on totality of the circumstances.
16. Criminal Law o^>1134(3)
Supreme Court reviews for correctness
trial court's legal conclusion of defendant's
valid waiver of rights upon being read Miranda warnings.
17. Criminal Law e»l 134(3)
Standard of appellate review of trial
court's legal conclusion of defendant's valid
waiver of rights upon being read Miranda
warnings grants measure of discretion to trial court because of variability of factual settings.
18. Arrest e=>63.4(15)
Police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for giving false personal information to police officer; upon valid police
stop of automobile in which defendant wTas
passenger, defendant gave name as his own
that he was unable to spell on two occasions,
and no arrest record was found by dispatcher
under name given by defendant, despite officer's recollection that defendant had recently
been arrested.
U.C.A.1953, 76-8-507;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
19. Arrest e»71.1(9)
Strip search of defendant at jail after his
arrest for giving false personal information
to police officer was supported by reasonable
suspicion that defendant was carrying drugs
and, thus, search did not violate Fourth
Amendment; police officer knew that defendant had previously been arrested for drug
offense, and officer had observed defendant
with his handcuffed hands in back of his
pants as though attempting to conceal something.
U.C.A.1953, 76-8-507; U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
20. Criminal Law e=>1031(l)
Because he failed to raise it at suppression hearing prior to his conditional guilty
plea, defendant was precluded from arguing
on appeal that arresting officers exceeded
permissible scope of interference.
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R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen. and David B.
Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff.
Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt
Lake City, for defendant.
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Jose Carlos Pena appeals the trial court's
denial of several motions to suppress evidence prior to his guilty plea for attempted
unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (7). Pena raises four
claims of error regarding the trial court's
evidentiary rulings: (i) The initial stop by
police was not supported by reasonable suspicion; (ii) Pena did not voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights; (iii) the misdemeanor arrest
was a pretext for the strip search; and (iv)
the strip search that produced the critical
evidence was unlawful. This case was certified to this court by the Utah Court of Appeals under rule 43 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. We affirm.
On April 10, 1991, the Salt Lake City
Police Department received a call from a 7Eleven clerk reporting a theft of prophylactics by a Hispanic male. A description of the
suspect and the vehicle in which he was
riding, including the license number, was
broadcast. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dale
Bench sighted the suspect vehicle and pulled
it over. The vehicle contained the driver and
one passenger. The passenger was later
identified as defendant Pena.
A second officer, Officer Buckholts, arrived
to assist Officer Bench, and the suspects
were then asked to step out of the car. Pena
apparently matched the description of the
theft suspect. A third officer, Officer Stevens, arrived and recognized Pena as having
recently been arrested for a drug offense.
Officer Stevens could not remember Pena's
name. Pena, who had no identification, told
police his name was Marcello Flores. However, on two occasions, he was unable to spell
the last name correctly, giving police the
spelling M-a-r-c-e-1-l-o F-o-s-e-s.
1. Salt Lake City Police Department policy allows
officers to issue citations for certain misdemeanors. However, identification or some other

Pena's inability to spell "Flores" led police
to suspect that he was lying about his identity. Officer Buckholts, who knew that the
prior drug arrest would be entered on the
police computer, requested that a dispatcher
search the records for the arrest under the
name Marcello Flores. No record was
found. The officers then arrested Pena for
giving false personal information to an officer, a misdemeanor.1 See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-507.
While transporting Pena to jail, Officer
Buckholts saw Pena ''moving around quite a
bit in the seat, . . . putting his [handcuffed]
hands down the back of his pants ..., [and]
trying to move them around to the front."
These actions led Buckholts to believe that
Pena was concealing narcotics. When they
arrived at the jail, Buckholts requested that
Pena be strip searched. During that search,
jail personnel discovered cocaine.
Pena was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony under section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and
with giving false personal information to a
peace officer, a class C misdemeanor under
section 76-8-507. Pena moved to suppress
statements he made prior to the arrest as
well as to suppress the cocaine. He argued
that the police violated his rights under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and article 1, sections 12
and 14 of the Utah Constitution. The trial
court denied the motions. Pena then entered, and the court accepted, a conditional
guilty plea to the lesser offense of attempted
unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
a class A misdemeanor. The conditional plea
preserved Pena's right to appeal the suppression ruling. He appealed to the Utah Court
of Appeals, and the matter was argued to a
panel of the court. That court certified the
case to us before decision, pursuant to rule
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
We first address the proper standard of
review for determinations of reasonable suspicion, which appears to be the reason for the
means of determining an individual's name and
birth date is required before a citation may be
issued.
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court of appeals' certification of this case.2
The State argues that we should apply the
clearly erroneous standard because reasonable-suspicion determinations are fact intensive and clearly erroneous is the standard
that we have suggested is appropriate for
fact questions. Pena, on the other hand,
argues that the standard of review should be
correctness because reasonable suspicion is a
legal conclusion. Both parties find support
for their contentions in various of our opinions and those of the court of appeals.
We recognize that this court and the court
of appeals have created some confusion with
regard to standards of review, perhaps in
part because this court has not focused much
attention on the articulation of those standards until recently, when they assumed an
increased level of importance. See State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-69 (Utah
1993). In State v. Mendoza, we reviewed a
reasonable-suspicion determination regarding an investigatory stop under a clearly
erroneous standard, upholding the trial
court's ruling. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah
1987). However, in State v. Ramirez, we
suggested that all applications of law to findings of fact that produce conclusions of law
are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness. 817 P.2d 774, 78112 (Utah 1991). Until recently, the court of
appeals tended to followT the language we
lsed in Mendoza, concluding that the issue
vas one of fact, because the deferential staniard of review had been used.3 See State v.
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah Ct.App.
.991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah
992); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435
Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d
. Counsel for both parties tell us that when this
case was argued before the court of appeals, the
standard of review issue was the subject of much
discussion. From that fact and from the fact
that the case seems otherwise unexceptional, we
assume that the standard of review is the reason
for the certification. For that reason, we treat
the issue in some depth, although how it is
decided may not be outcome determinative.
In the future, it would be of assistance to this
court if, when the court of appeals certifies a
case to us under rule 43, it would include a
statement of reasons so that we can be sure we
address the issues it deems important.
In retrospect, it is not clear whether Mendoza
meant that the reasonable-suspicion determina-

489, 493 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah Ct.App.1988). In
State v. Munsen, however, the court of appeals applied a correction-of-error standard
in reviewing a reasonable-suspicion determination. 821 P.2d 13, 14-15 (Utah Ct.App.
1991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
We endeavored to clarify this matter generally in Thurman, but did not specifically
address the standard of review for reasonable suspicion in that case. 846 P.2d at 1270
n. 11.
[1,2] Determination of the proper standard of review requires a brief discussion
which we hope will bring some clarity to
discussions of the issue. At the most basic
level, two different types of questions are
presented to a trial court: questions of law
and questions of fact. Factual questions are
generally regarded as entailing the empirical,
such as things, events, actions, or conditions
happening, existing, or taking place, as well
as the subjective, such as state of mind. See
Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—
Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 Marq.L.Rev.
231, 236 (1991) [hereinafter Hofer]. Legal
determinations, on the other hand, are defined as those which are not of fact but are
essentially of rules or principles uniformly
applied to persons of similar qualities and
status in similar circumstances. Id.
[3-6] Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of
fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an
appellate court under the clearly erroneous
standard. For a reviewing court to find
clear error, it must decide that the factual
tion was one of fact, which would clearly be
wrong, or whether it meant that this issue is an
application of law to fact upon which a trial
court should be given some discretion and the
"clearly erroneous" language was used to suggest that fact. Such a use of the term "clearly
erroneous" to refer to a standard of review for
the application of law to fact, although technically incorrect and potentially quite confusing, is
not uncommon. See Evan Tsen Lee, Principled
Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal
Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict,
64 S.Cal.L.Rev. 235, 236-37 (1991). In any
event, the result in Mendoza would not have been
different if a de novo standard had been applied.
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findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court's determination. See Wessel v. Enckson Landscaping
Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985); see also
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395. 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed.
746 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the trial court because it is before that
court that the witnesses and parties appear
and the evidence is adduced. The judge of
that court is therefore considered to be in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court
cannot hope to garner from a cold record.
In re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah
1983).
[7,8] When it comes to reviewing trial
court determinations of law, however, the
standard of review is not phrased as "clearly
erroneous." Rather, appellate review of a
trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term "correctness."
Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness" means the appellate court decides
the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination
of law. State v. Deli 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah
1993); see Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax
Cornrn'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
This is because appellate courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and
duty to say what the law is and to ensure
that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.
Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev.
751, 779 (1957); see Thurman, 846 P.2d at
1266. In other words, one can visualize the
traditional standard-of-review scheme as a
continuum of deference anchored at either
end by the clearly erroneous and correctionof-error standards, which correspond with
whether the issue is characterized as one of
fact or of law.
The parties here have characterized the
standard-of-review question before us in
terms of this fact/law distinction and argue
the issue as though the options were metaphorically black and white—one option being
"clearly erroneous" and the other "correct-

ness," with the first requiring very broad
deference to the trial court and the second
none. It is common for parties to characterize the standard-of-review debate in such a
polarized manner. Steven A. Childress, A
Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil
Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 328 (1989); see
Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making
and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate
Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64
S.Cal.L.Rev. 235, 239-45 (1991). However,
we think that these distinctions tend to obscure the real issues. Although the universe
of questions presented for review has often
been characterized as consisting only of mutually exclusive questions of fact or law,
there is really a third category—the application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the
determination of whether a given set of facts
comes within the reach of a given rule of law.
It is this determination that is at the heart of
the dispute between the parties over the
appropriate standard of review for reasonable-suspicion determinations. And it is a
dispute with real consequences.
Although implicitly recognizing this factto-law category of issues, the parties act as
though there are only two possible standards
of review—correctness and clearly erroneous. The State would like us to defer to a
trial judge's determination that on a particular set of facts reasonable suspicion was
present, thus raising a very substantial hurdle to one challenging such a trial court
determination. On the other hand, Pena
would like the opportunity to convince an
appellate court that the trial judge's factual
findings do not satisfy the legal standard for
reasonable suspicion. He wants us to make
this decision without deferring at all to the
trial judge on the application of the legal
standard to the facts: in other words, to
address the matter entirely de novo under a
correctness standard.
[9] This third category of determinations
raises thorny issues. In the abstract, the
effect of a given set of facts is a question of
law and, therefore, one on which an appellate
court owes no deference to a trial court's
determination. In recognition of this fact,
the standard of review for such determinations is termed one of "correctness." This is
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the message in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-82,
and in Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270 n. 11. and
it contradicts the State's claim that a clearly
erroneous standard of review is appropriate
here. To this degree, Pena is correct as to
the stated standard of review.
Nonetheless, the critical question, and one
of some subtlety, arises only after we have
said that an issue is a question of law and no
deference is owed the trial court. At this
point, we must attempt to determine when
the articulated legal rule to be applied to a
set of facts—a rule that we establish without
deference to the trial courts—embodies a de
facto grant of discretion which permits the
trial court to reach one of several possible
conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal.
This is really the point of the debate before
us. Put in terms of this case, does the legal
standard of reasonable suspicion grant any
discretion to the trial judge in applying that
standard to a set of facts? We think it does.
How much? Any answer requires a brief
discussion of the discretion that may be given
.rial judges to determine the application of
itated legal principles to facts.
As stated earlier, it is our role as an
ippellate court to define what the law is, and
re never defer to any degree to a trial court
n that count. That statement does not,
owever, tell us much about howr closely we
hould scrutinize the application of a statelent of legal principle to a specific set of
icts. Yet this is a critical question, for at
ottom, what a legal principle means in reali' can often be determined only by considerg how its general terms are given sharp
ifinition through their application to a sers of specific fact situations. See Hofer at
'4. Determining what the law is actually
volves an inductive process as much as a
ductive one. The governing legal standard
as often derived by abstraction from speic applications as it is defined in the ab%
act and then applied to specific situations.
t while we generally consider de novo a
al court's statement of the legal rule, we
en review with far less rigor the court's
termination of the legal consequences of
ts. The question before us today is
ether we can derive any principles to de-

termine when such scrutiny should be close
and when it should not and what those principles tell us about reviewing a finding of
reasonable suspicion.
We find much useful analysis on the rather
arcane topic of the degree of discretion to be
accorded a trial court's application of legal
propositions to facts in an excellent article by
Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From
Above, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635 (1971) [hereinafter Rosenberg]. Professor Rosenberg
describes the spectrum of discretion that
may be granted to a trial judge on questions
of law as running from "correctness" to
"abuse of discretion." However, we decline
to use this terminology because in Utah, we
have used the term "correctness" to refer to
the concept that an appellate court need not
defer to a trial court in the determination of
what the law is, including the legal consequences of a particular set of facts, and we
think that the term "abuse of discretion" has
no tight meaning. Compare Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah
1991) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict)
with State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40
(Utah 1992) (abuse-of-discretion standard for
rule 403 rulings). But if the terminology is
altered to fit our conceptual framework by
labeling the spectrum of discretion in functional terms, running from "de novo" on the
one hand to "broad discretion" on the other,
Professor Rosenberg's discussion is directly
pertinent to the questions before us.
The helpful metaphor Professor Rosenberg uses in describing these degrees of
discretion is that of a pasture. To the extent
that a trial judge's pasture is small because
he or she is fenced in closely by the appellate
courts and given little room to roam in applying a stated legal principle to facts, the operative standard of review approximates what
can be described as "de novo." That is, the
appellate court closely and regularly redetermines the legal effect of specific facts. But
to the extent that the pasture is large, the
trial judge has considerable freedom in applying a legal principle to the facts, freedom
to make decisions which appellate judges
might not make themselves ab initio but will
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not reverse—in effect, creating the freedom
to be wrong without incurring reversal.
Only when the trial judge crosses an existing
fence or when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining the law by
fencing off a part of the pasture previously
available does the trial judge's decision exceed the broad discretion granted.
As can be imagined, the real amount of
pasture permitted a trial judge will vary
depending on the legal issue, although the
terminology we use to describe the operative
standard of review does not begin to reflect
the many shades of this variance. The best
we can do is to recognize that such a spectrum of discretion exists and that the closeness of appellate review of the application of
law to fact actually runs the entire length of
this spectrum.
Our case law provides some examples of
legal issues that can be placed at points along
this spectrum of discretion, although we have
never spoken of what we are doing in quite
these terms. At the extreme end of the
discretion spectrum would be a decision by
the trial court to grant or deny a new trial
based on insufficiency of the evidence. See
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988);
see also Utah R.Civ.P. 50(d). In reviewing
this sort of decision, we give the trial court a
great deal of pasture. See Crookstoru 817
P.2d at 799; Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17. Also
toward the broad end of the spectrum is the
decision to admit or exclude evidence under
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. See Hamilton,
827 P.2d at 239-40. Other rulings on the
admission of evidence also generally entail a
good deal of discretion. See, e.g., Russell v.
Russell 212 Utah 12, 852 P.2d 997, 999
(1993); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,
1241 (Utah), cert, denied, — U.S.
, 114
S.Ct. 476, 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993).
On the other hand, there are situations in
which we narrow the pasture considerably
for policy reasons. One such example involves consent to a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment. See
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1269-71. Finally, at
the de novo end of the spectrum are issues
such as whether a "municipal function" has
been delegated to a state commission in violation of article VI, section 28 of the Utah

Constitution. See Utah Assoc. Mun. Pwvei
Sys. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 789 P.2d 298,
301-02 (Utah 1990); City of West Jordan v.
State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 533
(Utah 1988).
Occasionally, we expand or contract the
size of the pasture in response to things we
learn over time. A recent example is evidenced by our decision in Soter's, Inc. v.
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857
P.2d 935 (Utah 1993). In a series of earlier
cases, we had ruled that waiver was or was
not present as a matter of law on the specific
facts of those cases. This entailed fairly
close scrutiny of the application of the general stated waiver principles to particular fact
situations. In the course of those decisions,
we attempted to incorporate into the statement of the law of waiver those facts that led
us to decide each of those cases as we did.
See Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432
(Utah 1983). Over time, we appeared to
have developed hopelessly inconsistent elaborations on the basic statement of waiver principles. In Soters, we acknowledged that
fact, as well as the futility of attempting such
elaborations. 857 P.2d at 939. We then
stripped the statement of the law back to its
most basic form and told the trial courts to
apply it. Id at 942. The net effect was to
say that waiver is a highly fact-dependent
question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of
the law through a course of such decisions.
In terms of our present discussion, Soter's
increased the size of the trial court's pasture
because we found ourselves unable to describe the shape of the smaller one with
adequate clarity.
All the foregoing helps in understanding
the reality that underlies the rather wooden
characterization of standards of review which
we often use when discussing the application
of law to facts. And that reality suggests
criteria for determining when some degree of
deference may be given a trial court's application of a particular principle of law to
specific facts. A number of reasons usually
given for granting trial judges discretion on
legal questions are canvassed by Professor
Rosenberg. He finds three reasons that are
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useful in discerning when some degree of
discretion ought to be left to a tnal court: (i)
when the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied are so complex and varying that no
rule adequately addressing the relevance of
all these facts can be spelled out; (ii) when
the situation to which the legal principle is to
be applied is sufficiently new to the courts
that appellate judges are unable to anticipate
and articulate definitively what factors
should be outcome determinative; and (iii)
when the trial judge has observed "facts,"
such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that
cannot be adequately reflected in the record
available to appellate courts. Rosenberg at
662-63.
Of course, there are countervailing policy
reasons for not granting broad discretion to a
trial court. For example, in Thurman, we
found that while there were varying fact
patterns that would be relevant to determinations of voluntariness of consent, they
were not so unmanageable in their variety as
to outweigh the interest in having uniform
4. We reiterate that "[w]e review the factual findings underlying the trial court s decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a
clearly erroneous standard " State v Brown,
853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) It is not within
the appellate court s authority to review de novo
the factual underpinnings of a motion to suppress.
Some may take issue with the our decision not
to use the term ' clearly erroneous" in the context of reasonable-suspicion determinations, because that term is already m common usage
The change is necessary, however, m light of our
new analytical perspective As noted before, we
use the term "clearly erroneous to describe the
standard by which we review purely factual determinations This standard represents a fixed
allocation of power and responsibility between
the trial and appellate courts that is grounded in
our distinct and unchanging institutional competencies regarding questions of fact. Because
there is no inherent policy component in fact
determinations, it will never be appropriate for
an appellate court to overturn a trial court's
factual determinations when they have substantial record support. Given this grounding, we
decline to utilize the term "clearly erroneous" to
describe the standard used to review determinations that are not forever beyond the power or
responsibility of the appellate court to substitute
its judgment, but have only been placed temporarily beyond the reach of de novo review as a
matter of appellate court forbearance for institutional policy reasons. We think that clarity of

legal rules regarding consent to search, given
the substantial Fourth Amendment interests
lost as a result of such consents. Thurman,
846 P.2d at 1271.
[10-12] With these considerations in
mind, we move on to the question of the
standard of review appropriate to reasonable-suspicion determinations. We conclude
that the proper standard of review to be
applied to a trial court determination of
whether a specific set of facts gives rise to
reasonable suspicion is a determination of
law and is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness, as opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for clear error.4 We
further conclude that the reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a
measure of discretion to the trial judge when
applying that standard to a given set of facts.
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say,
but we would not anticipate a close, de novo
review. On the other hand, a sufficiently
careful review is necessary to assure that the
purposes of the reasonable-suspicion requirement are served.5
thought is promoted by usmg a different term to
convey that reasonable suspicion is ultimately a
legal question, and thus the appellate court does
have the ultimate authority to define, as it deems
appropriate, the contours of the disputed term.
Admittedh, this lexical change ma> engender
some confusion in the short term as appellate
judges and counsel become accustomed to it In
the long run, however, it should prevent the
development of two somewhat divergent and
likely confused lines of precedent, both purporting to apply to the same standard of review. If
we failed to make this change, ' clearly erroneous" would refer to situations in which the trial
court has fixed discretion and the appellate court
has a permanently limited role—the review of
factual determinations—and would also refer to
situations in which the trial court s discretion is
a matter of appellate court grace and the appellate court s role is reviewable over time and
circumstances—the application of fact to law
We believe it is better to change terms now than
to attempt to construct and maintain two different legal edifices, both of which rest upon the
same phrase
5.

Returning to our earlier metaphor, the appellate court reviews for correctness the placement
of the legal fences which delimit the pasture of
tnal court discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable suspicion. The decision when
to create and where to place these fences is an
issue of law, and no deference is accorded to the
trial court. Not every case that reaches an ap-
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Our decision to characterize the review as
something less than de novoh is largely due
to the first factor spelled out by Professor
Rosenberg: Reasonable-suspicion determinations are highly fact dependent, and the fact
patterns are quite variable.7 It would be
impractical for an appellate court to review
every reasonable-suspicion determination de
novo and then pronounce whether each
unique factual setting rises to the level of
reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. If
we were to try, it is likely that the resulting
case law would be confusing and inconsistent.
Our recent experience with the law of waiver,
discussed in Soter's, shows that this concern
is not fanciful. On the other hand, we are
not precluding this court or the court of
appeals from effectively fencing off parts of
the discretionary pasture from trial judges
once the reviewing courts have enough experience with certain recurring fact patterns
that the legal effect of those patterns can be
settled with comfort. However, except in
those situations in which appellate courts feel
comfortable in developing the law in such a
manner, trial courts should be permitted
some rein to grapple with the multitude of
fact patterns that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion determination. See Childress,
125 F.R.D. at 338.

State maintains that the dispatched report
was sufficient for the stop.
The United States Supreme Court has
held that an officer may stop and question a
person "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been,
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity." United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 702-03, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d
110 (1983). In determining whether such
reasonable suspicion exists, we have indicated that under certain circumstances, police
officers can rely on a dispatched report in
making an investigatory stop. State v.
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989).
Here, we think that the dispatcher gave Officer Bench sufficient information for him to
form a reasonable suspicion that Pena or the
driver had committed a crime, justifying the
stop of the car in which Pena was a passenger. We cannot agree that Officer Bench
was required to allow a suspect who matched
the detailed description given by the store
clerk to continue until another officer had the
opportunity to go to the 7-Eleven store and
interview the clerk. We therefore conclude
that the trial court did not err in finding that
the dispatched report contained articulable
facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.

[13] With this concept of reasonable suspicion in mind, we now address Pena's
claims. Pena first argues that the trial court
erred in finding that the stop by police was
supported by reasonable suspicion. He
claims that the police did not have reasonable
suspicion because they had not interviewed
the 7-Eleven clerk beforehand to assure that
a crime had taken place. In response, the

[14-17] Second, Pena argues that when
the police finally read the Miranda warnings
to him, he did not effectively waive his rights
because he did not fully understand English.
A waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred
from a defendant's "actions and words,"
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373,
99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979),
and is based on the "totality of the circum-

pellate court, however, must result m the establishment of a fence. Until the appellate court
has fenced off a particular area of the pasture—
that is, determined that a particular fact situation
does or does not create reasonable suspicion as a
matter of law—the trial court has discretion to
venture into that area—in other words, to determine whether a given set of facts satisfies the
legal standard of reasonable suspicion.

7. The multitude of variable fact patterns is easily
demonstrated. See State v. Ramirez, 817 ? 2d
774, 787-88 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable suspicion when a man seen walking near defendant
ran away); State v. Carpena 714 P.2d 674, 675
(Utah 1986) (vehicle moving at slow speed in
previously burglarized neighborhood at 3 a.m.
did not provide articulable facts on which to
formulate reasonable suspicion); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 16 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (woman's vague and suspicious responses did not provide basis to suspect that she had committed or
was about to commit crime).

6. We recognize that this "some discretion" standard is less than precise, but so are many legal
standards. It is difficult to describe more exactly
without the benefit of concrete factual scenarios.
We anticipate that developing case law will further illuminate the appropriate level of review.
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stances." State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224
(Utah 1989) (citing Fare v. Michael C, 442
U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d
197 (1979)). We review the trial court's legal
conclusion of a valid waiver for correctness.
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1111 (Utah
Ct.App.1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991), cert, denied, — U.S.
, 112
S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992). However, this standard of review grants a measure
of discretion to the trial court because of the
variability of the factual settings. See, e.g.,
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 466-67 (Utah
1988). Here, the trial court found that Pena
had no problem understanding English.
Based on that factual determination, we find
no error in the conclusion that Pena validly
waived his rights.8
[18] Pena next claims that his arrest for
giving false information to a police officer
was a pretext for the strip search and consequently was illegal. This contention is based
on the assumption that the arrest was improper. Because we find that the officers
had probable cause to arrest Pena, we do not
consider his pretext argument. Archuleta,
850 P.2d at 1237-38.
[19] Finally, Pena claims that the strip
search at the jail was unnecessary and intrusive and violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. Specifically, he argues that the misdemeanor arrest could not give rise to a valid
concern that he was carrying contraband or
weapons into the jail facility and, therefore,
the strip search was unjustified.

tutionality of strip searches following an arrest. The Court stated:
The test of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.
In each case it requires a balancing of the
need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the search
entails. Courts must consider the scope of
the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted.
Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884.
In this case, the trial court found that the
strip search was supported by a reasonable
suspicion that Pena wTas carrying drugs. Officer Buckholts knew that Pena had been
arrested for a drug offense, and he had observed Pena with his handcuffed hands in the
back of his pants as though attempting to
conceal something. On that factual basis, we
cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that a strip search was justified.
[20] We have considered Pena's other arguments and find them to be without merit.9
We affirm the trial court's denial of Pena's
motions to suppress.
STEWART, Associate C.J., and HALL
and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result.

In response, the State argues that under
federal law, strip searches are justifiable under circumstances amounting to less than
probable cause when the need to prevent
introduction of narcotics or contraband into a
holding cell outweighs the invasion of personal rights. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99
S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the United
States Supreme Court considered the consti-

HALL, J., acted on this case prior to his
retirement.

8- Pena also argues that once the vehicle was
stopped and he was asked to exit the car, he was
m custody or was "arrested" and therefore the
police were required to read him the Miranda
warnings before ever asking his name. Because
the argument was not raised below, we do not
consider it.

9. Pena also argues that the officers "exceeded
the permissible scope of the interference," but he
is precluded from making this argument because
he did not raise it at the suppression hearing.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)
("[W]here a defendant fails to assert a particular
ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will
not consider that ground on appeal.").
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POLICY

TO
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BETWEEN
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TRANSCRIPTION STATEMENT

Okay, this is Bob Harmon. I am in, I am near Lehi and it's the
21st of November, 1989. I!m talking to Paul Hardman and I!m
recording our conversation, I want to make sure that's alright with
you, could you say
A.

yes, that fine

Q,
Okay, Ifm going to turn the recorder off. Okay, I got the
recorder back on, ah, getting some background information on ah, a
horse car accident that happened last night ah, on Redwood Road
right near your house, is that right?
A.
yes, it was
Q.
Okay, and it involved, I guess the animal involved was your
horse, is that correct?
A.
yes, it was
Q.
Now you were going to give me some background information on
this so why don!t you just go ahead.
A.
Ever since ah, ever since deer season wefve had a lot of
problems with hunters coming in over here on this north pasture
which is just east of Camp Williams and I put a new fence up on the
north side and UNCLEAR pulling the other fence down so they can
drive in down to the river and go deer hunting, after that
accident, after the accident last night which by the way they
pulled down three times during the deer season, I of course rebuilt
the fence each time, so this morning, early this morning I came
over and I still had three horse were out and so I came over and
put them in and this canal where were going along now they came
along this canal road UNCLEAR followed them along here as you get
over here you'll see I found a fresh deer kill where someone
poached a deer, and this, this will be, it'll be fairly close to
the fence which they tore down also and then when we get on down
here will find where they've taken the wire off of the corner post,
lifted up over the top of the corner post, let the fence down so
that they can get in on the property and do whatever they were
going to do, well, that fence was up last Thursday, which was 4
days ago UNCLEAR time I was over here plowing and see this UNCLEAR

plowing on, I was over here plowing and checked the fence on
Thursday and then of course they got out now, I don't know if you
want to take a picture of whats left here of this deer kill or not,
maybe we ought to,
Q.
Well, we'll go take a look at it.
A.
I had the officer come and look at it and he didn't really do
much with it.
Q.
Okay,
A.
there is not a lot left, a match box here, you can see the
bloods still fresh here, ah, this morning there was a lot of
UNCLEAR right here and that oojich is all thats left now UNCLEAR I
had the county sheriff come out -cms mox.ii.Lnej and broughr him over
and showed him this kill and UNCLEAR went on down UNCLEAR
Q.
Okay, now you say ah, you were here last Thursday plowing this
field and the wire, fence was up that day, that was just the
previous Thursday, this being Tuesday and the accident happened
Monday night okay.
A.
so it would have been three days prior
Q.
Okay, now he has mentioned that ever since the deer hunting
season opened you have had problems with people taking these
strands of wire on this fence down.
A.
yeah, when we get over there I will show you, they drive
through there with there 4 wheelers and they can't get through
since I put that fence up to fence off.
Q.
When did you put that fence up?
A.
well, its been up for years but it was an electric fence and
deer kept knocking the fence down and so this year 1 pur up the
barbed wire fence because—of the deer knocking the electric fence
down and then I had no fence, so I put m e uaroea wire-fence up
this year and then they, they've actually twice they took their
undone the fence on the corner and I assume that's what it looked
like, and hooked it on their four wheeler on their trailer hitch
and just pulled the fence as far as they could pull it and pull the
whole fence down.
Q.
Oh, wow.
A.
and then
but they bent
bent them all
it again and

once, and then the third time they left the fence on
all the posts down right even with the ground just
the metal posts, and now this time they disconnected
left, and just dropped it down the ground so they

could come in and ah, the officer asked me, well are you sure that
the horses didn!t do it, well we know that as I showed him because
the fence was on the inside of the pasrure UNCLEAR were along the
inside when tne norses went"""dul:~you~kriow"~would have pushed it the
other way and also if the horses would have done it, its brand new
barbed wire big barbs on it, it would have, for them to do that it
would have just cut the heck out of them, whoever did it and no of
the horses have cuts, yeah, so someown had to let it down.
Q.
So how many of your horses got out this last night?
A.
well, let see I go*c, some of them are my dads but all total
what was there ah, let see there were three up there and there
were, probably eight, eight or nine got our last night, some of
them srayed in I think eight or nine got out,
Q,
How about going back further, have you ever had any of your
ah, do you just have horses is that the only animals?
A.
yeah, well I've got one cow and a few sheep but thats
Q.
Have you ever had any of your animals, horses, sheep or cattle
hit in the past, before last night?
A.
I had two lambs hit, quite a few years ago, up at the house
Q.
At the house, did they get out of a pen or something or how
were they hit?
Athey ah, as I recall, they crawled through a hole, or went
under the UNCLEAR fence or yeah, it was
Q.
Okay, in this field where you are going to take me where these
horses got out, had you ever had any of those horses get out and
get hit?
A.
no, never had
Q.
Okay, and how long have you had horses in this field that your
going to take me and show me?
A.
well, I change them, I have a pasture below the house and I
run them all summer and then I bring them over here in the fall
usually in September ah, cause they've eaten the other pasture off
and so I bring them over here and run there from September til the
snow gets deep, okay, then after that I take them up to the house.
Q.
I see, now you mention that you have had trouble with
apparenty hunters, poachers and hunters knocking down your fence.
A.
this fall

Q.
This fall and ah, ah, when they knocked it down previously had
you ever had your horses get out then?
A.
yeah, they got out about every time they knocked it, in fact
I would come home from work and I would see they would be out,
usually they would be feeding in this stuble field, we can see
right here, and so I would come over and put them in and after I
would put them in I would drive along the fence and that's how I
you know found out that it was down. Now Camp Williams, all this
area here is closed. Camp Williams is you know, we came through the
meral gates and there is another one down on this road, the only
way possible for those people to get in is up through Camp Williams
and we have had, they've had alot of problems this fall, he was
telling me this morning.
Q.
Who was telling you?
A.
Major Huff at Camp Williams was telling me that the last two
weeks they've had one truck stolen, a bunch of tools stolen the ah,
officer's quarters, or the officers club, they broke in there and
vandalized the officers club and plus alot of other vandalism in
the last two weeks plus about I guess it was during the deer hunt
right in there the large metal gate we just came through, there is
another one right down here on this lower UNCLEAR and they cam in
and the pulled those and you can see how big the gates were but
they hooked onto those and pulled them over and just tore the gates
apart with upright the support post bent them right over to the
ground and totally destroyed them, they had to put new, they just
put those in a week ago, replaced those gates, but all the problem
we have had is not people coming in from the south but the people
coming in from the north, everything seems to you know somebody
coming in from the north, whether they come through, well, they got
to come through Camp Williams thats all I can visualize, otherwise
they wouldn't have pulled the gate in from, from inside out.
Q.
Okay, now once, how many times then has your fenced been
pulled down this fall?
A.
this is four times
Q.
A.

This is the fourth time.
fourth time

Q.
Okay, and each time you have put it back up?
A.
each time I have rebuilt the fence, I have called Major Huff,
ah, ah, he can verify all the problems that we've been having and
tearing my fences down.

Q.
Did you strenghten your fence at any time, any of these times
that you've built it up?
Awell last time I out some corner braces in on a corner post
because when tne pulled it down they loosened up the corner post so
I put some braces
Q.
A.

Are the metal posts set in concrete?
no, no their driven in

Q.
Driven into the ground, okay, is there anyplace else where you
could have kept your horses instead of down here?
A.
not that I wouldn't had to feed them, no, I feed them hay
Q.
Yeah, during the winter you have to do that?
A.
yeah, but you know that's why I save this for the fall so that
you know I can get along without feeding hay as long as I can,
cause there running, there must be 120 acres, J.30 ac£es that
they've got there to run in so,
Q.

Okay, let me go ahead and turn the recorder off again.

Q.
Now when was the last time previous to this incident last
night when your horses got out?
A.
well after the deer hunt was over, I've not had any problems
with the horses getting out, the fence has been left up and they
just stayed in.
Q.
So the three previous times this fall that you fence was torn
down was during the deer hunting season?
A.
correct, also, perhaps and I'll show you some posts or corner
posts over here on a gate, where they took a shot gun and shot the
post right off, you can't UNCLEAR the post was cut off at ground
level and left the gate down and the horses got out the fence and
they shot a bunch of holes in the adjoining post which was a big
power pole and we can see the holes that go through the posts but
they didn't quite cut that one off, so its time now if the horses
were out ah, two days ago they were out and I came over and someone
had UNCLEAR fence up the two barbs top and bottom together so they
could crawl through the fence and there was only about three horses
out then, baby horses the big horses couldn't crawl through the
hole but the babies did.
Q.
I see, so ah, so you had some younger horses out then just a
couple days before this accident?
A.
yes

Q.
Same area then?
A.
yeahf same, I'll show you there within 50 yards from where
they took the fence down.
Q.

Okay, ITm going to go ahead and shut the recorder off again.

I certify that this is a correct transcription, typed on March 5,
1991/

Jodi Johanson
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Julia Lee Askew v. Paul Hardman
In the Utah Court of Appeals
Appellate No. 930537-CA
CHART COMPARING STATEMENT, DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT,
AND TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PAUL HARDMAN
REGARDING ISSUES OF LIABILITY

SUBJECT
Paul Hardman's
Testimony Is
Consistent with
Recorded Statement

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF PAUL HARDMAN
"Q. Now you say as you recall, do you have a clear recollection of your conversations with Mr. Harmon? . . . Do you remember what you
told him?
A. The same as I told you, as I recall." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 130, 131)
"Q. Tell me specifically what you said to Mr. Harmon regarding trespassing, poaching problems?
A. Basically the same thing I've told you, that in the springtime, we had problems with fishermen letting the fences down or tearing the
fences down, pushing the gate over because they didn't want to walk down to the river to fish. And in the fall time, we had problems with the
hunters, mourning dove hunters, rolling up fences. Or hunters don't know how to crawl through fences. They have to roll the wires or push
the fence over to get in. The same thing I've said before." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 135)
"Q. What else did you say to the sheriff, this representative, during that morning?
A. Nothing that I recall. I mentioned the problems we had with trespassers and, again, with the poachers. And he made a comment that he
would make a note of that and they would put extra patrols on out there.
Q. So you told the sheriffs representative you'd had problems with trespassers and poachers?
A. Yes. He and Bob Harmon, about the same I told them, you know. I don't recall saying one thing different to one than to the other."
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 145-146)

SUBJECT
Condition of the
Fence on the
Day Following the
Accident

"Q. Now you were going to give me some
background information on this so why don't
you just go ahead.
A. . . . they've taken the wire off of the
corner post, lifted up over the top of the
corner post, let the fence down so that they
can get in on the property and do whatever
they were going to do . . . .
. . . they disconnected it again and left, and
just dropped it down the ground so they could
come in . . . .
. . . the officer asked me, well are you sure
that the horses didn't do it, well we know that
as I showed him because the fence was on the
inside of the pasture UNCLEAR were along
the inside when the horses went out you know
would have pushed it the other way and also
if the horses would have done it, it's brand
new barbed wire big barbs on it, it would
have, for them to do that it would have just
cut the heck out of them, whoever did it and
no of the horses have cuts, yeah, so someone
had to let it down." (Statement, pp. 1-3)
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DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

"Q. So the next morning you went down to
the pasture?
A. Yes. . . . the wire of the fence was on
the inside of the pasture, that it had been
taken off from the post, it wasn't cut, it wasn't broken. It had been taken off from the
corner post and was on the inside of the
pasture." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol.
I, p. 101, 106)

"Q. While you're in that vicinity, can you
point out for the jury where, on the morning
of November 21st, you observed your fence
being down on the ground?
A. Up on the northwest corner in this area
right here." (Testimony of Paul Hardman, p.
7)

"Q. How many wires had been taken off the
corner post?
A. Two.
Q. . . . How much of the fence had been
taken down?
A. . . . from the corner, probably three
steel poles. It was all drooping. But I mean,
you know, laying on the ground, as I recall,
there were maybe three poles." (Deposition
of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 108-109)
"Q. And was there a reason that you thought
the horses would stay in the pasture given the
fence was down?
A. . . . My biggest concern was the fact
that the fence was down and that the wires
were on the inside of the fence. . . . I knew
that someone had let the fence down because
if the horses had got out because they pushed
the fence over, the wires would have been on
the north side of the fence rather than on the
inside, or they would have been on the outside. . . . I know I'm not liable because the
wires had been taken off from the corner
posts and the wires were on the inside of the
pasture on the winter pasture." (Deposition
of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 112-113)

2

"Q. And the corner post has orange painted
on it; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it from that corner that you observed the fence having been let down?
A. Yes.
Q. And the fence, as you observed it that
morning, was let down from that post?
A. Yes.
Q. And then back two or three poles from
there; is that right?
A. Yes." (Testimony of Paul Hardman,
pp. 15-16)

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

"Q. Now you were going to give me some
background information on this so why don't
you just go ahead.
A. . . . I found a fresh deer kill where
someone poached a deer, and this, this will
be, it'll be fairly close to the fence which they
tore down also . . . . I don't know if you
want to take a picture of what's left here of
this deer kill or not, maybe we ought to. . . .
you can see the blood still fresh here, ah, this
morning there was a lot of UNCLEAR right
here and that ponch is all that's left now
UNCLEAR I had the county sheriff come out
this morning and brought him over and
showed him this kill . . . ." (Statement, pp.
1-2)

"Q. And the horses then were grazing in
that area?
A. Horses were grazing here . . . . And as
I was coming along the canal, I noticed some
magpies . . . . So the magpies, as I got over
there, there had been a deer killed there.
There was entrails, deer entrails, and they
were almost gone. They had eaten a good
share of them." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 106-107)

Paul Hardman was not asked at trial about
his observations of the deer kill. Officer
Jerry Monson, the Utah County Sheriff officer called to the scene on the morning following the occurrence, testified as follows at
trial:
"Q. Let me ask you, Mr. Monson, what
your report states under 'observation.' I
believe that's what Mr. Morgan just referred
to.
A. Do you want me to read it?
Q. Sure. Please.
A. 'Reporting deputy responds to scene
with the R.P.' - with the reporting party 'and observed where the fence was down. It
appeared someone had knocked the fence
down with a full-size pickup truck as there
were old tire tracks near the fence. Also
reporting deputy observed where a deer had
recently been poached on the reporting
party's property.'
Q. You reference in your report that a
deer had recently been poached. How could
you tell a deer had recently been poached?
A. That was an assumption I made. I saw
a pile of entrails or innards in the vicinity of
where the fence was down." (Testimony of
Jerry Monson, p. 10)

SUBJECT
Observations of
Deer Kill on the
Day Following the
Accident
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SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

Construction and
Maintenance of the
Fence Before
Horses Were
Moved into the
Winter Pasture

"Q. Now you were going to give me some
background information on this so why don't
you just go ahead.
A. . . . I put a new fence up on the north
side . . . ." (Statement, p. 1)
"Q. When did you put that fence up?
A. . . . I put up the barbed wire fence
because of the deer knocking the electric
fence down and then I had no fence, so I put
the barbed wire fence up this year. . . . "
(Statement, p. 2)

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

"Q. . . . up until the summer of 1989 you
"Q. And had you replaced all the wire
around the pasture a year earlier than Novem- ' had an electric fence along this north fence
ber 21, '89?
line; is that right?
A. No, just the north. . . . it was electric
A. . . . the deer would come along the
fence, so I took the electric fence down and
bottom of the river where the fence drops
put in barbed wire.
over the hill . . . . An electric fence ~ if
they hit that fence, it was very easy to knock
Q. Why did you determine not to use an
over because it's not tied to the post substantially. Plus it's a much smaller wire, so they
electric fence on the north side of the fence
could break the wire. And I was concerned
anymore?
A. Maintenance. . . . I didn't have to
about the deer knocking the fence over . . . .
worry about weeds growing up or getting
So I changed the fence to a two-strand
under anything like that." (Deposition of Paul barbed wire fence on the north fence."
Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 147-149)
(Testimony of Paul Hardman, pp. 58-59)
"Q. Now I believe you have alleged during
the context of this lawsuit that you hired two
gentlemen to repair all or part of the fence
surrounding the winter pasture in 1989; is that
correct?
A. Yes. . . . I just told them to repair the
fence as needed, put new wire up if needed,
new posts, whatever it needs." (Deposition of
Paul Hardman, Vol. II, pp. 178, 185)

"Q. Now, how do you know that the distance between the poles and the height of the
wire is closer to being accurate . . . than the
estimates . . . you were asked to give at the
time your deposition was taken?
A. So this fall, after I did my annual fall
maintenance on the fence, which I always do
before I put the horses in after the wire was
stretched and the fence was prepared to put
the horses in, I made the diagram." (Testimony of Paul Hardman, pp. 96-97)
"Q. Did Doug Smith repair your fence
about four weeks before, three or four weeks
before the accident?
A. Yes, he did." (Rebuttal Testimony of
Paul Hardman, p. 24)
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SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

Prior Occurrences
of Fence Being
Torn Down

"Q. Now you were going to give me some
background information on this so why don't
you just go ahead.
A. . . . after the accident last night which
by the way they pulled down three times
during the deer season, I of course rebuilt the
fence each time . . . ." (Statement, p. 1)

"Q. . . . Again, we're talking a time two
weeks before November 20, '89. . . . And
how did you come to understand that someone
had pulled the fence down?
A. Because all the posts were bent over and
the wire was stretched out just to the north of
the pasture just as far as it could go.
Q. The wires had been taken off the posts?
A. Yes. . . . I think they took the wires off
from the posts, hooked them on their trailer
hitch, took off with the four-wheelers and it
bent all the metal posts. . . . " (Deposition of
Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 73)

"Q. . . . is it not true that you have had to
put the fence up many times even when the
horses weren't in as a result of trespassing?
A. Over the years that's a true statement."
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 3)

"Q. When did you put that fence up?
A. . . . so I put the barbed wire fence up
this year and then they, they've actually twice
they took their undone the fence on the corner
and I assume that's what it looked like, and
hooked it on their four wheeler on their trailer
hitch and just pulled the fence as far as they
could pull it and pull the whole fence down. .
. . and then once, and then the third time they
left the fence on but they bent all the posts
down right even with the ground just bent
them all the metal posts . . . ." (Statement,
p. 2)
"Q. Okay, now once, how many times then
has your fenced been pulled down this fall?
A. This is four times." (Statement, p. 4)
"Q. Now when was the last time previous to
this incident last night when your horses got
out?
A. . . . well after the deer hunt was over,
I've not had any problems with the horses
getting out, the fence has been left up and
they just stayed in." (Statement, p. 5)
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"Q. . . . I'm curious to understand the basis
for your understanding that it was trespassers
or poachers in your belief that had allowed
the horses to get out.
A. We seem to have two seasons out there
of people that come in. In the spring, fishermen, they come. They let the fences down. .
. . They'll tear the fences totally out, do
whatever they can to drive down to the river
to go fishing. Now there are no horses in
there in the spring, but the fact of the matter
is that it is trespassers and mostly fishermen
that are tearing the fences. We have a lot of
problems with them tearing the fences down.
. . . So when something happens, you know,
in my mind, I automatically go to trespassers,
fishermen, or hunters." (Deposition of Paul
Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 82-83)
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"Q. When you talked to Deputy Sheriff
Monson you told him that trespassers had
knocked your fences down several times
since the deer hunt; is that right?
A. When I talked to Deputy Sheriff Monson, I was referring to three incidents prior
to the accident, including the accident."
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 9)
"Q. . . . we're referring now to Deputy
Monson's report, where it says the RP,
which meant reporting party, said 'He has
put that section of fence up three times since
the deer hunt but the hunters keep knocking
it down.' Did you say that?
A. Yes.
Q. 'Was that an accurate statement?' And
your answer was, 'Could have been two
times rather than three.' Is that right?
A. Yes." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul
Hardman, pp. 10-11)
"Q. The report you gave to Mr. Monson is
that the fence had been torn down by hunters
two or three times since the deer hunt, was
what, the day after the accident?
A. Day after the accident." (Rebuttal
Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 13)

SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

The Repair of
the Fence During
the Fall Hunting
Season

"Q. Now you were going to give me some
background information on this so why don't
you just go ahead.
A. . . . after the accident last night which
by the way they pulled down three times
during the deer season, I of course rebuilt the
fence each time . . . ." (Statement,
P- 1)

"Q. How did you go about fixing the fence
[when it was torn down approximately two
weeks before the incident]?
A. Bent the posts back up straight,
stretched the wire back to the corner posts,
tied it on, then secured the barbed wire back
to . . . the metal post." (Deposition of Paul
Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 75-76)

"Q. Okay, now once, how many times then
has your fenced been pulled down this fall?
A. This is four times.

"Q. If I could refer you to the last sentence
of that section [of the Utah County Offense
Report printed 12/18/89] where it says the RP
said he has put that section of fence up three
times since the deer hunt, but the hunters
keep knocking it down. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall having made that statement to the officer?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that an accurate statement?
A. Could have been two times rather than
three.
Q. You recall having put the fence up at
least two times?
A. Yes.
Q. And perhaps three?
A. Yes.
Q. Would that be prior to the occasion on
November 20, 1989, when the fence was
knocked down?
A. Yes, yes." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. II, pp. 195-196)

"Q. If you'll turn to page 195 in your deposition, that's your second deposition. Are
you there?
Bottom of page 195, line 22 the question
is, if I could refer you to the last sentence of
that section, we're referring now to Deputy
Monson's report, where it says the RP,
which meant reporting party, said, 'He has
put that section of fence up three times since
the deer hunt but the hunters keep knocking
it down.' Did you say that?
A. Yes." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul
Hardman, pp. 9-10)

Q.
back
A.
..."

Okay, and each time you have put it
up?
. . . each time I have rebuilt the fence .
(Statement, p. 4)

"Q. Did you strengthen your fence at any
time, any of these times that you've built it
up?
A. . . . well last time I put some corner
braces in on a corner post because when the
pulled it down they loosened up the corner
post so I put some braces." (Statement, p. 5)
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"Q. If you'll turn to page 198 of your
deposition, beginning on line 10, the question
was, 'Do you recall whether on the two or
three times prior to November 20, 1989 that
the fence had been knocked down?'
Now, I'm referencing the period of the
deer hunt of 1989 up through November 20,
1989. 'Do you recall on any of those occasions whether Mr. Smith or Mr. Allred fixed
the fence after it had been knock down?'
Your answer was, 'No, they did not.' Question, 'You fixed the fence?' The answer,
'Yes'; is that correct?
A. That's what I said." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 15)

SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

The Repair of
the Fence During
the Fall Hunting
Season
(cont'd)
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TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN
"Q. . . . The question was, 'And since
between the time of the ten days after, I take
it, the third Saturday of October of '89 and
November 20 of 1989 you had put the fence
up at least two and maybe three times because of it having been knocked down by
someone; is that accurate?'
Answer, 'It could have included the time
period of the deer hunt from --' Question,
'Of the October '89 deer hunt?' Answer,
'Yes.'" (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 21)
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SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

Prior Occurrences
of Horses Escaping
from Pasture

"Q. This fall and ah, ah, when they knocked
it down previously had you ever had your
horses get out then?
A. . . . yeah, they got out about every time
they knocked it, in fact I would come home
from work and I would see they would be
out, usually they would be feeding in this
stuble field, we can see right here, and so I
would come over and put them in and after I
would put them in I would drive along the
fence and that's how I you know found out
that it was down." (Statement, p. 4)

"Q. Now with respect to any of the two or
three times that you've described, did horses
escape on any of those occasions?
A. Yes.
Q. How many of those occasions did horses
escape?
A. Maybe all two or three. I'm not sure.

"Q. Have your horses ever pushed through
a barbed wire fence?
A. I've never known my horses to push
through a barbed wire fence, no." (Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 112)

"Q. Now when was the last time previous to
this incident last night when your horses got
out?
A. . . . well after the deer hunt was over,
I've not had any problems with the horses
getting out, the fence has been left up and
they just stayed in." (Statement, p. 5)
"Q. So the three previous times this fall that
your fence was torn down was during the deer
hunting season?
. . . two days ago they were out and I came
over and someone had UNCLEAR fence up
the two barbs top and bottom together so they
could crawl through the fence and there was
only about three horses out then, baby horses
the big horses couldn't crawl through the hole
but the babies did." (Statement, p. 5)
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Q. Do you recall on any of those two or
three occasions when the horses escaped
where they went?
A. . . . Not all of them had escaped at one
time. Some were out. The time I can remember, there were three or four that were
out, and the rest were still in the pasture.
And they stayed right there at the pasture.
They didn't go anywhere." (Deposition of
Paul Hardman, Vol. II, pp. 199-200)
"Q. Other than this occasion in 1988 and the
occasion in 1989 on November 20, are you
aware of any other occasion when horses
escaped from the winter pasture?
A. . . . After I put the horses in in October
of '89, towards the end or during the deer
hunting period, the fence had been taken
down and the horses had gotten out during
that period. . . .
Q. Do you recall how many days or weeks
prior to the evening of the accident that occurred?
A. Approximately maybe two weeks, a
week to two weeks." (Deposition of Paul
Hardman, Vol. I, p. 71)
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"Q. Now with respect to any of the two or
three times that you described, did horses
escape on any of those occasions and your
answer was yes. 'How many of those occasions did horses escape?' Your answer?
A. 'Maybe all two or three. I'm not
sure.'" (Rebuttal testimony of Paul Hardman, pp. 11-12)
"Q. . . . Question, 'Is your recollection
such that you can deny that they escaped
other than on the one occasion?' Your answer, 'No, not all of them had escaped at
one time. Some were out. The time I can
remember there were three or four that were
out and the rest were still in the pasture and
they stayed right there in the pasture. They
didn't go anywhere.' Did I read that accurately?
A. That's right and I think that clarifies
the question previous, that the time that they
had escaped, I said three, and refers to the
one time, and it also refers on one of those
other questions that I couldn't recall exactly
how many times. And again, Counselor, this
is three years after the fact and it's difficult
to remember specific times and days." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, pp. 1213)

SUBJECT
Prior Occurrences
of Horses Escaping
from Pasture
(cont'd)

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

"Q. Okay, in this field where you are going
to take me where these horses got out, had
you ever had any of those horses get out and
get hit?
A. No, never had." (Statement, p. 3)

"Q. And do recall how it was that you came
to know that the horses escaped? . . .
A. . . . when I came down to plow, I saw
they were out. They were eating over in that
alfalfa field. So I went over to see why, I
mean, to see why they were out. And I
noticed that someone pulled the fence down."
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 73)

"Q. . . . with regard to putting the fence
up, did horses get out of the pasture on any
one of those occasions when you put the
fence back up other than the one time two
weeks before the accident and the date of the
accident?
A. The horses had only been out the one
time." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 24)

"Q. Other than the occasions we've discussed, . . . are you aware of any other occasion when horses owned by you escaped from
the summer pasture or the winter pasture?
A. I can't tell you a year or a day. I
mean, I can't even recall them being out. But
there may be times when they got out in that
period of time. That's a long time ago."
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 78)
"Q. Why did you assume in making that
statement that the horses had escaped because
of trespassers or poachers?
A. Because the only time that the horses
were out was because of trespassers or poachers. (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p.
82)
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SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

Checking Fence
Before the Occurrence

"Q. Now you were going to give me some
background information on this so why don't
you just go ahead.
A. . . . that fence was up last Thursday,
which was 4 days ago UNCLEAR time I was
over here plowing and see this UNCLEAR
plowing on, I was over here plowing and
checked the fence on Thursday and then of
course they got out now." (Statement, pp. 12)

"Q. Do you recall the time you got off
work?
A. Somewhere around 4:00. . . . The day
of the accident, I left Geneva, I drove down
to the pasture, drove along the road, and just
observed the fences from the vehicle when I
drove down, looked at them." (Deposition of
Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 86)

"Q. And you had been there at 4:30 p.m.
on the evening of - afternoon of November
20, 1989; is that correct?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And at that time did you make a visual
personal observation of the fence line on the
north end?
A. Yes, I did.

"Q. And you drove along that road the
afternoon of the 20th at approximately 4:30?
A. Yes.
Q. And you specifically observed that the
fence was up?
A. Yes." (Deposition of Paul Hardman,
Vol. I, p. 88)

Q. And did you daily check your fences
the two weeks prior to the accident on November 20?
A. Yes, I did." (Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 150)

"Q. Okay, now you say ah, you were here
last Thursday plowing this field and the wire,
fence was up that day, that was just the previous Thursday, this being Tuesday and the
accident happened Monday night okay.
A. So it would have been three days prior."
(Statement, p. 2)*
*Paul Hardman was not asked during the
taking of his statement about his practice for
checking the fence that surrounds the winter
pasture. He was also not asked if he checked
the fences on the day of the occurrence.
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"Q. Is that something that you had ever
done before?
A. . . . When I get up in the mornings, one
of the first things I do is walk over to the
window and look in my binoculars to see
what's going on out there. . . . I look out
there many times a day if I'm any time in the
bedroom . . . . And the other way that I
would check those fences is I'd physically
drive over there two, three times a week to
check. Well, plus I'm farming over there . .
. and so I'm in that vicinity anyway." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 95-96)
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"Q. You said that three times a week you
would inspect this fence immediately preceding the accident; is that correct?
A. I said every day.
Q. Oh. Every day, then?
A. We're talking about two to three weeks
before the accident, yes." (Testimony of
Paul Hardman, p. 152)

SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

Checking Fence
Before the Occurrence (cont'd)

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

"Q. And those daily driveby observations
occurred in the fall of 1989?
A. Yes.
Q. On a daily basis?
A. Average three times a week. There
may be a day during the week that I didn't go
over there." (Deposition of Paul Hardman,
Vol. II, pp. 278-279)

"Q. On November 20, 1989 at 4:30, tell us
where you were and what observations you
made.
A. I came along this road here observing
the fence line right next to the road . . .

"Q. Now you refer to daily field glass
checks from house?
A. Yes.
Q. Were those daily field glass checks
conducted during November of '89?
A. Yes.
Q. Who conducted those checks?
A. I usually always check. And many
times my wife would check also, so sometimes they'd get checked twice." (Deposition
of Paul Hardman, Vol. II, p. 279)
Prior Incidents of
Trespassing

"Q. Now you were going to give me some
background information on this so why don't
you just go ahead.
A. Ever since deer season we've had a lot
of problems with hunters coming in over here
on this north pasture which is just east of
Camp Williams . . . pulling the other fence
down so they can drive in down to the river
and go deer hunting . . . ." (Statement, p. 1)
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"Q. Tell me approximately how many instances of trespassing . . . you experienced in
the spring with respect to the winter pasture
in the five years prior to November of 1989.
A. Instances where the fences have been
pushed over or gates let down, possibly maybe five, six times a summer during the summer.
Q. How about in the fall, the same time?
A. Maybe one or two times." (Deposition
of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 84)
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Q. Were the posts and wires in place on
November 20, 1989 at 4:30 p.m. when you
last saw it prior to the accident.
A. Yes, sir." (Sur Rebuttal Testimony of
Paul Hardman, pp. 2, 4)

"Q. You had never previously had two or
three incidents of trespassing in that short of
time at that place in the north pasture; isn't
that true?
A. That's true." (Rebuttal Testimony of
Paul Hardman, p. 14)

|

SUBJECT

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

Prior Incidents of
Trespassing
(cont'd)

"Q. This fall and ah, ah, when they knocked
it down previously had you ever had your
horses get out then?
A. . . . the only way possible for those
people to get in is up through Camp Williams
and we have had, they've had a lot of problems this fall, he was telling me this morning." (Statement, p. 4)

"Q. Were you aware of poaching problems
in the vicinity of the winter pasture prior to
November 20, 1989?
A. Yes. . . . This is a popular area for
people to poach because of the deer population down there." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 89)

"Q. Then if you could turn in your second
deposition to page 223, the question was
asked at line 10, 'Do you recall 1989 being
any different than years before that with
respect to the number of incidences of trespass in the vicinity of the winter pasture?'
A. 'The incidences for the north fence line
have been taken down two or three times
within a month, month and a half. I have
not had that problem prior to that.'
Q. Was that your testimony?
A. Yes." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul
Hardman, p. 28)

"Q. Now when was the last time previous to
this incident last night when your horses got
out?
A. . . . well after the deer hunt was over,
I've not had any problems with the horses
getting out, the fence has been left up and
they just stayed in." (Statement, p. 5)

"Q. And so in part, the reason you checked
it so often was because of the trespassing
problems?
A. Some, yes." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 96-97)
"Q. Do you recall 1989 being any different
than years before that with respect to the
number of incidences of trespass in the vicinity of the winter pasture?
A. The instances where the north fence line
had been taken down two or three times
within a month, month and a half period, I've
not had that problem prior to that." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. II, p. 223)
"Q. Would it be fair to characterize the
trespass problems in the area of the winter
pasture as being much more severe or significantly more severe than in the area of the
summer pasture?
A. Yes." (Deposition of Paul Hardman,
Vol. II, pp. 224-225)
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"Q. You've had problems with hunters
coming over there, is that right?
A. Yes, that was prior to when we put the
locked gates up, which was approximately
seven or eight years prior to the accident."
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 4)
"Q. 'Were you aware of poaching problems
in the vicinity of the winter pasture prior to
November 20, 1989?'
A. 'No. Trespassers, yes. Not poaching.'
Q. Question, 'And what awareness did you
have regarding poaching problems prior to
November 20, 1989?'
A. 'People down in there spotlighting.'"
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 23)

SUBJECT
Reports to Camp
Williams

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

"Q. Okay, and each time you have put it
back up?
A. . . . each time I have rebuilt the fence, I
have called Major Huff, ah, ah, he can verify
all the problems that we've been having and
tearing my fences down." (Statement, p. 4)

"Q. Did you have any agreement with the
guard service at Camp Williams that no one
was to enter the winter pasture area without
your written permission?
A. . . . a number of times, we mentioned
to Camp Williams that people were not to go
onto our property without permission, written
permission. And we told the guards at the
gate." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I,
p. 22)

"Q. The two or three incidents immediately
prior to the accident, you didn't report any of
those to the Sheriff's Office, did you?
A. Reported them to the guard service but
did not call the police." (Rebuttal Testimony
of Paul Hardman, p. 14)

"Q. And could you tell me approximately
how many conversations you recall having or
that you are aware of that were had with
Camp Williams and the guard service regarding access or entry to your pasture?
A. If we had found trespassers down on
our property, . . . I'd go up or call up at
Camp Williams and just reemphasize the fact
that we didn't want trespassers on our property." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I,
pp. 23-24)
"Q. Do you recall anyone in particular that
you spoke with at Camp Williams about this
matter?
A. I have talked to Major Huff . . . ."
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 25)
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SUBJECT
Reports to Camp
Williams
(cont'd)

C:\WP51\ASKEW\101214.TBL

RECORDED STATEMENT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN
"Q. Did you have any discussions with
Camp Williams regarding any of those occasions when the fence had been knocked down?
A. It's very possible that I did.
Q. Do you have a specific recollection of
any conversation?
A. No. I talked to Camp Williams occasionally or the guard gate if there had been
problems, but I don't remember exactly when
they were." (Deposition of Paul Hardman,
Vol. II, p. 199)

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF
PAUL HARDMAN

|
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GLEN A. COOK, # 3710
COOK & LAWRENCE, L.L.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East # 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
801-261-5297

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT MURRAY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELDA M. SCOTT,

:

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

:

vs.
ALBERTSONS INC.,
Defendant.

:

Civil No.

930010891

:

Judge Michael K. Burton

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
1.
individual

Please provide a copy of any statements taken from any
by

defendant's

insurance

company,

its

agents,

its

adjusters, or its investigators.
Please see Askew v. Hardman, 249 UAR 22 (October 11, 1994) .
Dated this i-f

day of

Qa f

, 1994.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the ^ r

day of &d z4
?~#//
v<? r

,

1994, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINT/IFF' S /
SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS to be mailed, pootage
prepaid-, to the following:
Stephen G. Morgan
Joseph E. Minnock
Morgan & Hansen
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
UM

U7

/

at

